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Beyond lava: Redistribution of Risks
in the Administration of Unemployment
Insurance
James M. Klein* and Thomas E. Willging**
I. INTRODUCTION
(CONGRESS ESTABLISHED unemployment compensation pro-
grams "to provide a substitute for wages lost during a period
of unemployment not the fault of the employee."' The objective
was to enable workers "to tide themselves over, until they get back
to their old work or find other employment without having to resort
to relief. ' 12  To insure that a claimant does not have to resort to re-
lief, benefit payments must be promptly initiated.3 Thus the Social
Security Act includes a requirement that participating state unem-
ployment compensation programs must be designed to insure full
payment of benefits "when due."4
There is, however, considerable difficulty in reconciling delayed
payment under the present administrative appeal system with this
congressional objective. This goal received renewed recognition
and support by the Supreme Court in California Department of
Human Resources Development v. lava,5 which held that the sum-
mary suspension of a claimant's unemployment compensation bene-
fits pending an administrative appeal by his employer created a delay
in benefit payments that violated the purposes of the Social Security
Act. After lava, the employee who is found qualified at the initial
* James M. Klein (B.A., University of Michigan; J.D., Case Western Reserve Uni-
versity) is Assistant Professor and Co-Director of the Civil Law Clinic at the University
of Toledo College of Law, and is admitted to the California and Ohio Bars.
* * Thomas E. Willging (A.B., LL.B., Catholic University; LL.M., Harvard) is As-
sociate Professor and Co-Director of the Civil Law Clinic at the University of Toledo
College of Law, and is admitted to the District of Columbia and Ohio Bars.
1 California Dep't of Human Resources Dev. v. Java, 402 U.S. 121, 130 (1971).
2 H.R. REP. No. 615, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1935).
3 At the time the Social Security Act was passed, it was estimated that there would
normally be a 2-week waiting period with 4 weeks as the outer limit. See Hearings
on S. 1130 Before the Senate Comm. on Finance, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 1319, 1321
(1935).
4 42 U.S.C. § 503(a)(1) (1970).
5402 U.S. 121 (1971).
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determination level will receive benefits which cannot be suspended
merely because his employer decides to appeal.
There are several open issues and other difficulties, however, which
this article will examine. Using a risk allocation analysis of unem-
ployment compensation, it becomes apparent that the qualified
claimant inequitably bears all the risk and absorbs the entire finan-
cial impact of an erroneous decision at the initial determination.
In some states, if there is an initial determination against the claim-
ant, he may have to prevail at two separate appellate levels before
benefit payments will begin. Even when the claimant is found quali-
fied initially, there is a weekly reverification process in which the
claimant may be erroneously disqualified. If this occurs, he must go
through the normal appellate procedures and delays to restore bene-
fit payments. It is the contention of the authors that these problems
can be substantially reduced or eliminated by the adoption of recom-
mendations presented in this article.
II. STANDARDS FOR APPLICATION OF
THE CONCEPTS OF RISK AND ENTITLEMENT
Commentators have long recognized that "Etihe common de-
nominator in all social welfare programs and protections is the factor
of vulnerability to a socially recognized risk"6 and that "the present
provisions of American welfare law ... are centered around specific
risks and each carries conditions of entitlement related to that par-
ticular risk."7
The legal issues currently being presented to the courts can be
described as a twofold quest by claimants of unemployment com-
pensation for prompt recognition of their entitlement to benefits,
and for an equitable distribution of the risk of improper denial of
benefits. These claimant expectations are supported by the general
purposes of the unemployment insurance provisions of the Social
Security Act-particularly the provision requiring methods of admin-
istration "to be reasonably calculated to insure full payment of un-
employment compensation when due.""
Reference to general principles of social insurance, risk distribu-
tion, and statutory entitlement is necessary to establish standards by
which the courts and legislatures can measure the effectiveness of
6 Wickenden, Social Welfare Law: The Concept of Risk and Entitlement, 43 U.
Dnr. L.J. 517, 519 (1966).
7 Id. at 521.
8 42 U.S.C. § 503(a)(1) (1970).
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the administration of unemployment insurance. The unemployment
compensation system is usually described as a system of social insur-
ance designed to protect the individual and society against the ef-
fects of unemployment. In many respects, however, it is unlike
other systems of social insurance, particularly in its manner of financ-
ing. Unemployment compensation funds are derived from individual
employers, often at rates varying with the experience rating of a
particular employer and the experience rating formula applied by
his state. In contrast, other social insurance programs are financed
either from the general revenues of a political entity, as are public
assistance programs and farm subsidies, or from a broad spectrum of
the population, as is Old Age and Survivors Disability Insurance.
Unemployment compensation has many features that would cate-
gorize it as an "enterprise liability" form of social insurance.'" The
underlying premise of enterprise liability is "the notion that losses
should be borne by the doer, the enterprise, rather than distributed
on the basis of fault .. "'I Assuming that enterprise-related un-
employment losses fall into this category, enterprise liability is
justified by the economic postulate that a free enterprise system de-
mands accurate cost allocation to allow the buyer to make informed
decisions based on the actual costs of competing products.'2
To assess the degree to which the administration of the unem-
ployment compensation system meets the standards of an effective
system for the allocation of risk of loss from enterprise-related un-
employment, it is necessary to consider the following requirements
of accurate cost allocation: (1) the costs of injuries should be borne
by the activities which cause them;' 3  (2) the initial burden of a
loss should be allocated to the party in the best position to insure
that those costs will be reflected in the price of the product; and
(3) the cost of distribution of benefits should be borne by the party
whose insurance costs are lower.' 5
These principles are reflected in the statutory structure of the
Social Security Act. As the Supreme Court emphasized in lava,
9 See note 38 infra.
10 See generally Calabresi, Some Thoughts on Risk Distribution and the Law of
Torts, 70 YALE L.J. 499 (1961); Morris, Enterprise Liability and the Actuarial Pro-
cess - The Insignificance of Foresight, 70 YALE L.J. 554 (1961).
11 Calabresi, supra note 10, at 500.
12 id. at 502.
13 Id. at 505.
14Id. at 506-07.
15 Id. at 506.
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minimizing the impact of loss of employment is central to the pur-
poses of the Act.'" For example, the taxing mechanism is designed
to spread the risk of loss by shifting the initial burden of that risk
from the employee to the employer and by extending the risk over
a period of time. In addition, devices such as experience ratings,
which act as disincentives to employee layoffs, are intended to mini-
mize the amount of loss.
17
While extensive commentary has been devoted to this broad fed-
eral statutory framework and the extent to which the eligibility and
tax structure accomplish their stated goals,' 8 relatively little discus-
sion has focused on the question of whether the administrative pro-
cess created by the states serves those same ends.' 9 In analyzing this
question we shall use several general guidelines.2 First, we must
consider whether any aspect of the administrative process "conflicts
with, or adversely affects the impact of the ethical import of unem-
ployment compensation" 2 1-- that "payment be made to an eligible
claimant as a matter of right."22 If there is a conflict, we must then
decide whether the adverse impact is nonetheless justifiable because
the administrative practice is essential to the determination of
whether the claimant's unemployment is within the risks that the
unemployment compensation laws are designed to cover, "involun-
tary unemployment due to economic conditions,""I and because that
16 402 U.S. at 131-33; see text accompanying notes 42-44 infra.
17 See note 38 infra.
18J. BECKER, PROGRAMS TO AID THE UNEMPLOYED IN THE 1960's (1965); W.
HABER & W. COHEN, SOCIAL SECURITY PROGRAMS PROBLEMS AND POLICIES (1960);
Lester, The Uses of Unemployment Insurance, in THE AMERICAN SYSTEM OF SOCIAL
INSURANCE (W. Bowen, F. Harbison, R. Lester & H. Somers eds. 1968); S. LEVITAN,
PROGRAMS IN AID OF THE POOR FOR THE 1970's, at 36-40 (1969); C. ScHOTrLAND,
THE SOCIAL SECUITY PROGRAM IN THE UNITED STATES 80-94 (2d ed. 1970); SPE-
CIAL COMM. ON UNEMPLOYMENT PROBLEMS, READINGS IN UNEMPLOYMENT, 86th
Cong., 2d Sess. (Comm. Print 1964); Clague, The Economics of Unemployment Com-
pensation, 55 YA.LE L.J. 53 (1945); Wagener, Twenty-Five Years of Unemployment
Insurance in the U.S., 23 SOCIAL SECtRITY BULL. 50 (1960); A Symposium on Un-
employment Insurance, 8 VAND. L. REV. 179 (1955); Note, Inequitable Disqualifica-
tion from Unemployment Insurance in Minnesota, 54 MINN. L. REV. 1319 (1970);
Note, Charity Versus Social Insurance in Unemployment Compensation Laws, 73 YALE
L.J. 357 (1963).
1' Generally such discussion emphasizes the possibility of fraud by claimants in the
distribution of benefits. See, e.g., Becker, The Problem of Abuse in Unemployment
Benefits, in SPECIAL COMM. ON UNEMPLOYMENT PROBLEMS, supra note 18, at 1412.
2 0 These standards have been adopted from Note, Charily Versus Social Insurance
in Unemployment Compensation Laws, 73 YALE L.J. 357 (1963).
211d. at 388.
22 Id. at 359.
23 Id. at 373.
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practice is on an average the least onerous alternative. Finally, we
must consider "whether reasonable safeguards have been provided
to minimize its adverse impact on the ethical import of unemploy-
ment compensation." 24
III. Java AND A TYPICAL STATE
UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE PROGRAM
Since current litigation and debate about state unemployment in-
surance programs concern issues first raised by the Supreme Court in
lava, we commence our discussion with that case. The two plaintiffs
in lava, having lost their jobs, filed claims with the California De-
partment of Human Resources Development. Prior to losing their
jobs, the plaintiffs had earned sufficient wages in employment cov-
ered by the California unemployment insurance program to qualify
for the receipt of benefits. After an eligibility investigation, the
claimants began receiving weekly benefits. Shortly thereafter, their
former employers appealed the determinations to a state referee. Pur-
suant to section 1335 of the California Unemployment Insurance
Code,25 no further payments were permitted pending decisions on
appeal, even though the Department's favorable determinations re-
mained unchanged. In the interim both claimants were forced to
apply for public assistance in order to support their dependent chil-
dren.
Prior to the referee hearings, the claimants instituted a class
action in federal district court to enjoin the enforcement of section
1335 on the grounds that the statute was unconstitutional and in-
consistent with the requirements and purposes of sections 303 (a)
(1) and 303 (a) (3) of the Social Security Act.2 6  A three-judge
court issued a preliminary injunction enjoining the state from sus-
24 Id. at 388.
2 5 CAL. UNEMPL. INS. CODE § 1335 (West 1956), as amended, CAL. UNEMPL.
INS. CODE § 1335 (West 1972).
26 42 U.S.C. §§ 501-03 (1970) determine how money to assist states in the admin-
istration of their unemployment compensation programs is to be provided. Sections
503(a)(1) and (3), the sections most pertinent to Java and to this article, provide:
The Secretary of Labor shall make no certification for payment to any
State unless he finds that the law of such State, approved by the Secretary of
Labor under the Federal Unemployment Tax Act, includes provision for -
(1) Such methods of administration . . .as are found by the Secretary
of Labor to be reasonably calculated to insure full payment of unemployment
compensation when due; and
(3) Opportunity for a fair hearing, before an impartial tribunal, for all
individuals whose claims for unemployment compensation are denied ....
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pending the unemployment benefits of recipients. It held that section
1335 deprived claimants of benefits without a prior hearing in vio-
lation of the due process requirements set forth in Goldberg v.
Kelly2 and that the seven week delay in payments violated the
"when due" provision of the Social Security Act.28 The Supreme
Court unanimously affirmed the lower court's decision. The Court,
however, found it unnecessary to reach the due process issue because
it agreed with the lower court holding that section 1335 of the Cali-
fornia Unemployment Insurance Code conflicted with the require-
ments of section 303 (a) (1) of the Social Security Act.2
In many respects, California's unemployment insurance program
represents a typical state system. As in the other states, 0 Cali-
fornia's program receives financial support from the federal govern-
ment in the form of tax and fiscal benefits pursuant to the Social
Security Act.3 ' No grant may be made to a state unless the Secre-
tary of Labor certifies the amount to be paid,32 and certification is
conditional upon his finding that the state's program conforms to
federal requirements.33
27397 U.S. 254 (1970).
2 8 Java v. California Dep't of Human Resources Dev., 317 F. Supp. 875 (N.D. Cal.
1970).
29 402 U.S. at 122.
30All 50 states, the District of Columbia, and the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico
have enacted unemployment insurance programs. See U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, MAN-
POWER ADMINISTRATION, BUREAU OF EMPLOYMENT SECURITY, COMPARISON OF
STATE UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE LAws 1-1 to 1-23 (1972 ed.) [hereinafter cited
as CSUIL].
3142 U.S.C. §§ 501-03, 1101-05 (1970). These benefits are substantial. In 1968,
for example, California received $90,085,000 from the Federal Unemployment Insur-
ance Program as reimbursement for administrative costs. U.S. STATISTICAL ABSTRACT
table 571, at 384 (1970).
There are significant tax benefits realized by the employer as well. Most employers
are required by the Federal Unemployment Tax Act, 26 U.S.C. §§ 3301-09 (1970),
to pay into the Treasury an excise tax on the first $4,200 of each employee's annual
wages. The taxes so collected are later transferred from the Treasury to the Federal
Unemployment Trust Fund for credit to the employment security administration ac-
count - out of which the states are reimbursed for administrative expenses. 42 U.S.C.
§ 1101(b) (1) (1970).
Employers who are subject to state unemployment compensation laws may credit
their contributions to the state programs against the federal excise tax. Full use of
the credit can reduce the tax from the 1973 rate of 3.28 percent to an effective rate of
0.58 percent. For an explanation of the tax and credit see 1A UNEMPL. INS. REP. 55
20,003-60 (1973).
82 42 U.S.C. § 502(a) (1970).
3 3 As the Court stated in upholding the constitutionality of the unemployment
compensation program. "What they [the states] may not do, if they would earn the
credit, is to depart from those standards which in the judgment of Congress are to be
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In order to be eligible for benefits, a claimant is required to have
earned a specific amount of wages during his base period. 4 Benefits
are paid from the state employment fund, which consists of funds
collected from private employers35 and money credited to the state's
account in the Federal Unemployment Trust Fund pursuant to
statute.36  An individual employer's rate of contribution to the fund
is determined by each state3 7 and to some extent is based upon his
experience rating.3 8
The determination process-the process whereby validity of the
unemployed worker's initial claim is determined by the state-is for
the most part uniform throughout the various unemployment com-
ranked as fundamental." Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 594 (1937); cf.
Oklahoma v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 330 U.S. 127, 143 (1947). See also DeVyver, Fed-
eral Standards in Unemployment Insurance, 8 VAND. L. REV. 411 (1955).
34 CAL. UNEMPL. INS. CODE § 1281 (West 1972). Because the Social Security
Act incorporates no standards for benefits in the unemployment insurance system, the
states have developed varying formulas for determining workers' benefit rights. In all
of the state programs, however, a worker's benefit rights depend upon his experience in
covered employment in a past period of time called the "base period." The period dur-
ing which the worker is entitled to the benefits at the established rate is called the
"benefit year." In order to qualify for benefits, the claimant must have earned a spe-
cific amount of wages or have worked a certain number of quarters or weeks in covered
employment within the base period, or have done both. The range of the amount of
earned base period wages required in order to be eligible for minimum benefits varies
from $150 (Puerto Rico and Hawaii) to $1,200 (Washington). The median is ap-
proximately $500. Id. at 3-27 to 3-29 (rev. Jan. 1973).
35 CAL. UNEMPL. INS. CODE § 976 (West 1972). The states finance the unemploy-
ment funds primarily through contributions from subject employers on the wages of
their covered employees. The funds collected are held for the states in the Federal Un-
employment Trust Fund. It is from this fund that money is drawn to pay benefits and
to refund contributions erroneously paid. Each state determines its own rate of contri-
bution. In most states, the standard rate - i.e., the rate required of employers until
they are qualified for a rate based on their experience - is 2.7 percent, the maximum
credit allowed by the Federal Unemployment Tax Act. CSUIL at 2-1. See note 31
supra.
3642 U.S.C. §§ 501-03, 1101-05 (1970).
37 See, e.g., CAL. UNEMPL. INS. CODE §§ 976-78 (1953). See note 35 supra.
38 All state programs use some system of experience rating by which the employers'
contribution rates are varied from the standard rate on the basis of their experience with
the risk of unemployment. CSUIL at 2-4 (rev. Jan. 1973). Although the experience
rating formulas incorporated in the various state laws differ widely, there are certain
characteristics common to all of the state programs.
All formulas are devised to establish the relative experience of individual em-
ployers with unemployment or with benefit costs. To this end, all have fac-
tors for measuring each employer's experience with unemployment or benefit
expenditures, and all compare this experience with a measure of exposure -
usually payrolls - to establish the relative experience of large and small em-
ployers.
Id. at 2-5. For a description of the five systems of experience ratings employed by the
states see id. at 2-5 to 2-7.
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pensation programs in the 50 states and the District of Columbia.39
The California initial determination process, described in detail in
Java,40 commences when the claimant files for benefits at a local
state office by providing information concerning his last employer,
the reasons for his separation from employment, and his work ex-
perience. The employer is notified of the claim and must, within 10
days, submit any facts that may affect the claimant's eligibility for
benefits. The claimant is informed that he must serve a waiting pe-
riod consisting of the first week of unemployment, during which he
receives no payment.41 He is then instructed to return during the
third week for a second, more complete interview to determine his
eligibility. The loser, whether claimant or employer, can appeal the
determination. When the claimant was successful and the employer
appealed, the pre-Java practice in California was to delay payment
pending the outcome of the appeal.
The Court noted in lava that this practice forced the claimant to
wait seven to 10 weeks before receiving any benefits. It determined
the legislative history of section 301 (a) (1) of the Social Security
Act supported the conclusion that "full payment of unemployment
compensation when due" was intended to mean "at the earliest stage
of unemployment that such [benefitj payments were administrative-
ly feasible after giving both the worker and the employer an op-
portunity to be heard."42 The Court stated that Congress intended
unemployment compensation as a prompt replacement of wages
to the newly unemployed worker both to provide subsistence while
he sought new employment and to prevent him from resorting to
welfare. In addition to benefiting the individual worker, prompt
payments would also have a stabilizing influence on the national
economy in that consumer purchasing power would be maintained
during the period of unemployment.44 California's procedures were
held to be unlawful because they frustrated these congressional ob-
jectives. The time within which a claimant receives money due him
3 9 See 1B UNEMPL. INS. REP. 5 2020, at 4541-43 (1971). For a compilation of
all of the state programs see id. 55 3000-62 (1972).
40 402 U.S. at 125-29. See also the district court opinion, 317 F. Supp. at 877-78.
41 In all states except Alabama, Connecticut, Delaware, Kentucky, Maryland, Nevada,
and New Hampshire, the first week is a noncompensable period of unemployment in
which the claimant must have been otherwise eligible for benefits. See CSUIL at 3-5,
3-6 (rev. Jan. 1973).
42 402 U.S. at 133.
43ld. at 131. See also H.R. REP. No. 615, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1935).
44 402 U.S. at 132. See also Hearings on S. 1130 Before the Senate Committee on
Finance, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 1-6 (1935) (statement of Robert Wagner).
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thus emerges as a crucial factor in determining the validity of any
unemployment insurance scheme. Although lava dealt only with a
time lapse at the stage of a first appeal, the question of undue de-
lays at other points in the claims process and of their effect on the
validity of the state system is apparent.
IV. ANALYSIS OF POST-Java ISSuES
A. Payment After Victory
The United States Department of Labor45 and a recent case on
the issue46 have interpreted the rationale of Java as entitling the
claimant to payment after he prevails at any stage of the hearing
process. Thus, payment would seem to be "due" the claimant who
45 The United States Department of Labor has issued a letter evidently intended to
effectuate both the spirit and specific holding of Java. With one exception, it extends
the Java rationale to any decision favorable to the claimant at any stage of the adminis-
trative process and would seem therefore to resolve most of the issues involved in pay-
ment after victory. The letter states in part:
VIII. Payment of Benefits During Investigation, Determination, Redetermi-
nation and Appeals (Including Higher Authority)
A. Under the Java decision benefits allowed in an initial determination may
not be withheld by reason of the pendency of the appeal period or of an ap-
peal.
B. In addition, the reasoning of the Court in the Java decision supports the
payment of benefits as indicated below.
1. Redeterminations
Since practices vary so widely among the States, the following covers only
the most common kinds of redeterminations:
(a) When a claimant was initially found ineligible and another interested
party is involved, notice and opportunity to be heard in a predetermination
proceeding must be offered both parties before a redetermination can be made.
No benefits may be paid until the redetermination is completed and then bene-
fits are to be paid immediately or denied, according'to the redetermination.
(b) When a claimant was initially found eligible, notice and opportunity
to be heard must be afforded to the claimant and any other interested party be-
fore a redetermination can be made that could modify or reverse that initial
determination. In the meantime benefits may not be withheld. Benefits will
be paid or denied upon the issuance of the redetermination and in accordance
therewith.
2. Appeals
Except as it may be precluded by a "double affirmance" provision in the
state law, an appeal decision should be given immediate effect when it is is-
sued and benefits should be paid or denied in accordance with it regardless
of the issue involved or previous determinations and decisions and regardless
of the fact that a further appeal may be taken.
3. Payment of Benefits for Weeks Not in Dispute
In the case of an appeal, it has been the practice to pay benefits only for
weeks "not in dispute." For example, in a voluntary-quit case where State
law provides a variable 1-to-6 week disqualification, and a 3-week disqualifica-
tion has been assessed, benefits would be withheld for 6 weeks, because the
appeal decision could result in increasing the disqualification. The reason-
UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE
prevails either at the initial determination or at any one of the ap-
pellate proceedings. 7
The administrative reconsideration, of which all interested
parties are notified, may be based solely on the factual record com-
piled at the initial determination. It may, however, include addition-
al facts submitted by the parties, uncovered by the local office in a
renewed fact-finding process, or obtained by the examiner. Thus, at
a minimum, reconsideration can be viewed as a supervisory exten-
sion of the initial determination and is entitled to at least the same
importance and protection as that provided to the first determination
under the lava standards. The additional input of new evidence and
information at the reconsideration level adds weight to the argument
that payment must be made promptly upon the rendering of that de-
cision and not be stayed pending further appeal.
Since the investigatory and determinative processes become pro-
gressively more refined as the claimant moves through the appellate
process, the arguments favoring payment become even more com-
pelling after a favorable decision at each successive level of ap-
peal.4 8 Fact-gathering and use of evidence at the hearings, although
not bound by strict rules of evidence, are highly formal in contrast
to the expedited and often incomplete investigative process used in
the initial determination and the administrative reconsideration. The
ing of the court in the Java case leads to the conclusion that benefits after the
3-week disqualification initially imposed are due and are to be paid if the
claimant is eligible for such later weeks....
United States Dep't of Labor Unemployment Insurance Program Letter No. 1145, at
18-19, Nov. 12, 1971 (footnotes omitted).
48 Crawford v. Games, IA UNEMPL. INS. REP. 5 21,385 (N.D. Ohio 1972).
47The benefit appeals procedure differs from state to state. Some states permit an
administrative reconsideration following the initial decision, and a few (Idaho, Michi-
gan and Ohio) require a redetermination before an appeal can be taken. All states
provide for a lower level administrative appeal, usually in the form of a referee hearing.
Most states provide for an upper level administrative hearing, which in about one-half
the states takes the form of a 3-member board of review or appeals board. All states
then provide for resort to a state court of general jurisdiction. For a discussion of the
various appeals procedures see CSUIL at 5-4 to 5-6 (rev. Jan. 1973) and 1B UNEMPL.
INS. REP. g 2020 (1972).
48 In Ohio, the amount of time allocated per case for the hearing process is approx-
imately 14 times greater than that allocated to either the initial determination or the ad-
ministrative reconsideration. (655 minutes for the referee hearing and the Board of
Review hearing, compared to 45 minutes for the initial determination and administra-
tive reconsideration): Telephone interview with Beman Pound, Director, Unemploy-
ment Compensation Division, Ohio Bureau of Employment Services, on Aug. 10, 1972.
In addition, the financial resources allocated to the reconsideration hearing process
are much greater than for the initial hearing because of the higher salary range for at-
torney hearing examiners. Interview with Don Allman, Claims Manager, Toledo Area
Office, in Toledo, Ohio, Aug. 7, 1972, by Thomas Willging.
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hearings are conducted by a referee, who in many state programs is
an attorney, the parties are sometimes represented by counsel, a
record is maintained, the parties are available for confrontation and
cross-examination, and the subpoena power is more easily exercised.
The greater time allocation per case and the more efficient fact-
finding ability at the hearing level indicate that the decisions at that
level should be more reasoned and enlightened than those of the ini-
tial determination or the reconsideration.
We recognize, as did the court in Crawford v. Games, that a
corollary of the "payment after victory" rule is "nonpayment after
defeat."4 The only point at which this rule would be questionable
is when an initial determination of eligibility is reversed at the ad-
ministrative reconsideration level. Such a reversal denies an estab-
lished statutory entitlement without the benefit of an opportunity to
be heard other than by written submission. This procedure may be
constitutionally inadequate to protect the interests of individuals
who are often unskilled in the art of writing and who have little
expertise in the often complicated area of unemployment insurance
law.50
Standards of risk distribution also compel payment to a clairant
victorious in the appeal stages of the process. The risks involved
are that the claimant will not be given payment at the time that his
need is the greatest in terms of the purposes of the act (minimiza-
tion of unemployment, maintenance of consumer purchasing power,
and avoidance of dependence on welfare), or that an overpayment
will be issued and the state's reserve account in the unemployment
compensation fund will be unfairly charged. The low-income, low-
asset claimant does not have sufficient reserves to absorb the cost of
delay and to engage in the activities that the statute seeks to pro-
mote (search for employment, consumption of goods and services,
and avoidance of welfare). Welfare payments are often not avail-
able promptly enough, or in sufficient amount, to meet the emer-
gencies created by loss of employment. The consequences of fail-
ing to immediately compensate the victorious claimant are twofold:
First, the economic burdens will be borne by the individual or by
society; and second, the burden cannot be completely remedied by
payment at a later time. The economic harm is by definition im-
mediate.
49 1A UNEMPL. INS. REP. 5 21,385 (N.D. Ohio 1972).
5 Cf. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 268-69 (1970), aff'g Kelly v. Wyman,
294 F. Supp. 893, 903-04 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
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The reserve account of the unemployment compensation fund is
in a better position than the individual claimant to absorb the costs
of delay. Several techniques are available to reduce the possibility of
loss caused by delay and to redress loss in the event of overpay-
ment. The Java Court specifically cited two devices to minimize
losses. First it suggested recoupment of overpayments either by an
offset against future claims for benefits or by civil action.' The
use of civil actions would permit a beneficial distinction to be drawn
between those claimants with substantial assets and those who are
judgment-proof. This procedure would also avoid the negative
aspects of the offset device, that is, the anomalous result that over-
payments might be recovered at a future time when the claimant is
properly entitled to benefits.
The Java court's second suggested method of minimizing losses
is mutualization of overpayment. Mutualization would avoid the in-
justice of imposing the entire cost of overpayment on the employer
of a claimant who erroneously received benefits.52 Mutualization
spreads the risk of overpayment among all the covered employers
within a state,53 and therefore indirectly among all the covered em-
ployees of the state under the theory that unemployment insurance
is an earned fringe benefit which is part of the labor costs of busi-
ness. Mutualization is accomplished at minimal additional expense
in that the fixed costs of collecting the funds are necessary to the
creation of the overall unemployment insurance fund. The incre-
mental cost of establishing and administering a mutualized fund is
also undoubtedly less than the alternative of employees creating a
new fund to cover the specialized risk of overpayment.
The principle of "payment after victory" is subject to trouble-
some exceptions in states that have the so-called "double affirmance"
rule, requiring the claimant who initially loses to prevail at two ap-
pellate stages of the unemployment insurance process before bene-
fits are payable.54 This rule is recognized as an exception to the
51402 U.S. at 129 n.8.
52402 U.S. at 135-36 n.19 (Douglas, J. concurring).
53Unless there is such mutualization, the employer would be adversely affected by
the reduction in his insurance fund and the consequent change in his experience rating
and tax level. We anticipate that those states which do not now provide for mutualiza-
tion will amend their statutes to meet the increased need for mutualization created by
the Java decision.
54 See, e.g., TEXAS REv. CIr. STAT. ANN. art. 5221b-4(b) (1971). Since the
Java decision, however, the legality of this rule is questionable.
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"payment after victory" principle by the Department of Labor.55
"Double affirmance" appears to be contrary to the rationale of lava,
which would seem to support a finding of statutory entitlement
whenever a determination is made in favor of the claimant.
In summary, we can say that both the Department of Labor, de-
spite its recognition of the "double affirmance" exception, and the
Crawford decision, in extending lava to decisions after the initial
determination, are based on sound principles of risk distribution.
B. Continued Claims Cases - Who Should Pay
A claimant prevailing at the initial determination must meet cer-
tain conditions if he is to continue receiving benefits. State laws
require that a claimant in the continued claim category: (1) register
in person each week during which he is claiming benefits;5" (2) be
able to work and available for suitable work;5" and (3) actively seek
work.58  If a recipient's benefits are terminated for failure to meet
these conditions, he may appeal the decision by the same procedure
(reconsideration, referee appeal, etc.) as one who was initially de-
termined ineligible. A key question is whether a state's summary
termination or suspension of the unemployment benefits of a re-
cipient in the continued claims category violates the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment and the "when due" provisions
of section 303 (a) (3) of the Social Security Act.
1. Due Process.- Crow v. California Department of Human
Resources Development 9 was the first case to hold that a recipient
has the due process right to a fair hearing prior to the termination
of his benefits because of an alleged refusal to accept suitable work.
A similar decision was reached in Wheeler v. Vermont,60 where
the district court stated that
unemployment compensation benefits cannot be treated different-
ly from the welfare benefits in Goldberg v. Kelly; the right to
wages free from prejudgment attachment protected in Sniadach v.
Family Finance Corporation; the right to a tax exemption granted
in Speiser v. Randall; and the right to public employment articu-
lated in Slochower v. Board of Higher Education.6 1
55 See note 45 supra.
56 See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4141.29(A)(3) (Page 1965).
5 7 See, e.g., id. § 4141.29(A)(4).
58Id.
59325 F. Supp. 1314 (N.D. Cal. 1971), cert. denied before judgment, 408 U.S.
924 (1972).
60 335 F. Supp. 856 (D. Vt. 1971).
61 Id. at 861 (citations omitted).
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The Wheeler court specifically rejected a contrary view asserted
by yet another three-judge district court. Writing for a two-to-one
majority in Torres v. New York State Department of Labor,62 Cir-
cuit Judge Paul R. Hays distinguished unemployment compensa-
tion claimants from the welfare recipient of Goldberg, and held that
since in the case of the former there is an "absence of the 'brutal
need' on which the court rested its decision in Goldberg, the govern-
ment interests to which the Court referred must be held to out-
weigh plaintiffs' claim." 63 The Torres court noted that the eligibil-
ity criterion for unemployment compensation is not need, as it is for
Aid for Dependent Children and Home Relief, and that unemploy-
ment compensation claimants denied relief could resort to welfare
if they could show the requisite need. 4
On appeal, the Supreme Court did not reach the merits, but in-
stead remanded Tortes for reconsideration of the statutory issue in
light of its opinion in lava." The district court found lava distin-
guishable and, in a per curiam opinion, adhered to its prior decision
upholding the New York termination procedure."6 The Supreme
Court summarily affirmed without the benefit of full briefing or oral
argument, and without opinion." Shortly thereafter, however, the
Court noted probable jurisdiction in Indiana Employment Security
Division v. Burney," ' a case presenting issues identical to those in
Torres. The district court in Burney had found that an Indiana
statute permitting termination, withholding, or reduction of bene-
fits "because of an administrative determination of ineligibility af-
ter an original determination of eligibility," frustrated the purposes
of section 303 (a) (1) of the Social Security Act.69 The lower court
did not reach the due process issue7" which at least three Supreme
Court Justices would probably consider controlling.71
62321 F. Supp. 432 (S.D.N.Y. 1971) (three-judge court), vacated, 402 U.S. 968,
iudgment reinstated, 333 F. Supp. 341, aft'd, 405 U.S. 949 (1972), rehearing denied,
93 S. Ct 1446 (1973).
63 321 F. Supp. at 437.
64 Id.
65 402 U.S. 968 (1971).
66 333 F. Supp. 341 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
67405 U.S. 949 (1972) (mem.). See 93 S. Ct. at 1447.
68 406 U.S. 956 (1972).
69 Hiatt v. Indiana Employment Sec. Div., 347 F. Supp. 218 (N.D. Ind. 1971).
70 Id. at 223.
71See Indiana Employment Sec. Div. v. Burney, 409 U.S. 540, 546 (1973) (Mar-
shall, J., joined by Brennan, J., dissenting), citing, Torres v. New York State Dep't of
Labor, 405 U.S. 949 (1972) (statement of Douglas, Brennan, and Marshall, JJ.).
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With Burney pending, the Court held a petition for rehearing
in Tortes in abeyance, and thus gave every indication that a final
ruling upon the legality of prehearing suspensions of unemploy-
ment compensation benefits would come in Burney and that the peti-
tion for the rehearing in Torres would be disposed of in accordance
with that decision.7" This seemingly logical prediction has proven
false; the Court has instead disposed of Torres in a fashion that Mr.
Justice Marshall has aptly characterized as "bizarre."73  Subsequent
to their respective district court cases, the claimants in both Burney
and Tortes were given full post-termination hearings on the merits
of these claims. Termination of Mrs. Burney's benefits was reversed
and termination of Mr. Torres' benefits was reaffirmed. Thus at
the time each case reached the Supreme Court, neither claimant was
suffering a denial of due process or being denied benefits "when
due." If mootness was a possibility, it was equally possible in both
cases.74  The Supreme Court apparently discerned an "inarticu-
lated"75 distinction between the cases, however, and remanded Bur-
ney 6 for possible mootness and then simply denied the petition for
a rehearing in Tortes in a memorandum opinion.7 The Court has
since denied a petition for rehearing on its decision to remand Bur-
ney for mootness 8
Though Mr. Justice Marshall's compelling dissents to the remand
in Burney79 and to the denial of rehearing in Tortes80 offer the only





76409 U.S. 540 (1973).
'7793 S. Ct. 1446 (1973).
7893 S. Ct. 1435 (1973).
79 409 U.S. at 542.
80 Mr. Justice Marshall's dissent, joined by Mr. Justice Brennan and Mr. Justice
Douglas, is nothing less than vitriolic:
By summarily denying this petition for rehearing, the Court finally disposes
of important issues of constitutional law and statutory construction in a fashion
which can only be characterized as bizarre. Although the case has now been
before us on three separate occasions, by [sic] Brethren have yet to write so
much as a single word in defense of a disposition which is seemingly incon-
sistent with a raft of our prior cases [citing Burney, Java, and Goldberg). I
cannot concur in this cavalier treatment of a question that is of vital impor-
tance to the thousands of citizens who, through no fault of their own, are
temporarily unemployed.
... [Ejven if I accepted the Court's unarticulated conclusion that this
case is distinguishable from Burney, I would still object to the summary fashion
in which the District Court is affirmed today.... [I]ssues which in Burney
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articulation of policy in face of a consistently silent majority, they
have no authoritative value and therefore posit only speculative ex-
planation of the majority's actions. Some speculation beyond Mr.
Justice Marshall's complaint of inarticulated distinctions is, how-
ever, possible. It may be that a majority of the Justices are simply
unwilling to settle the continued claims issue left open 'by Java at
this time. Or, the majority may be awaiting an opportunity to re-
verse an unmoot Burney and to adopt Judge Hays' Torres reasoning
in a full opinion.8' On the other hand, there are significant factual
distinctions between Tortes and Burney. Despite the fact that the
three-judge district court's second opinion in Tortes re-affirmed the
first, the court's characterization of the facts in its second opinion
indicated that the New York procedure under consideration did not
involve summary termination of benefits. Although termination was
not preceded by a full-scale Goldberg style hearing, both plaintiffs
were asked for information about their activities, and both were
given opportunities to clarify their situations before decisions were
made. As the second Torres opinion stated: "The suspension of
benefits was, therefore, not an automatic consequence of Torres' em-
ployer's action, nor was it made without a hearing."' The district
court in Burney, on the other hand, found a summary termination
of benefits without a satisfactory hearing.8 3
A possibility exists, therefore, that the Court was satisfied with
the termination procedure followed in Torres and saw no reason
to discuss the district court decision any further. If this is the case,
the Court may be awaiting an appeal from an unmooted Burney
to delineate a due process requirement of a limited pretermination
hearing of the sort found in Tortes and to thus limit the application
of the welfare due process requirements of Goldberg in the area of
unemployment compensation. It is also possible that the Court will
were considered so significant as to require setting the case for argument have
now, inexplicably, become so trivial as not even to require an opinion. It
is not without irony that petitioners, who claim a deprivation of due process
because vital benefits are denied them without a hearing, are unable to secure a
hearing before this Court.
I would have thought that if the rights recognized in Goldberg and Java
were to be sharply limited, the Court would at least have found it necessary
to explicate the basis for this limitation and delineate the new reach of those
new decisions.
93 S. Ct. at 1446-48.
81 See text accompanying notes 62-64 supra.
82 333 F. Supp. at 344.
83 347 F. Supp. at 223.
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reverse or even ignore84 its memorandum opinions in Torres and
affirm the lower court in Burney.
. In light of such uncertainty, critical analysis of the lower court's
ruling in Torres is in order. It should first be noted that the two
primary constitutional arguments raised by the first Torres decision
- i.e. that Goldberg can be distinguished because it involved
welfare benefits which, unlike unemployment benefits, relieve a
"brutal need," and that state interests in reducing administrative
costs outweigh the interests of the claimant - have been soundly
discredited by the Supreme Court in its latest amplification of Gold-
berg. In Fuentes v. Shevin,85 which held that procedural due pro-
cess requires an opportunity for a hearing before chattels can be
taken from an individual in a state-sanctioned replevin proceeding,
the Court rejected a reading of Goldberg that would limit its appli-
cation to denials of "necessities. ' 86  Pointing to Bell v. Burson,7
which held that there must be an opportunity for a hearing before
suspension of a driver's license, the Fuentes Court stressed that due
process protection goes far beyond "necessities," and to some extent
beyond traditional "property" concepts.88
Furthermore, there is serious doubt that the first Torres court was
correct in characterizing unemployment benefits as qualitatively dif-
ferent from welfare benefits. As Judge Morris Lasker noted in his
dissent in the first Torres opinion, "there are often cases in which,
because of delay in the administrative process and personal lack of
resources, those deprived of unemployment compensation are in dire
straits.''89 Although after Goldberg and Fuentes the importance of
8 4 See, e.g., Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66 (1969), (right to jury where more
than six months imprisonment authorized) making no mention of Jones v. Louisiana,
392 U.S. 302 (1967) (mem.) (one year imprisonment, but no jury trial). But see
Rosenbloom v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 450 (1967), citing as dispositive Sunshine Book
Co. v. Summerfield, 355 U.S. 372 (1958) (mein.).
85 407 U.S. 67 (1972).
86 "[I]f the root principle of procedural due process is to be applied with objec-
tivity, it cannot rest on such distinctions." Id. at 90.
87 402 U.S. 535 (1971).
88 407 U.S. at 89. For a thorough analysis of the Fuentes decision, see Neth, Re-
possession of Consumer Goods: Due Process for the Consumer: What's Due for the
Creditor, 24 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 7 (1972).
89 321 F. Supp. at 439 (Lasker, J., dissenting). The Wheeler court also criticized
the majority view in Torres:
The fact that unemployment benefits are paid without reference to need, that
is to say, without reference to a means test, does not mean that a given claim-
ant's need is qualitatively different from a welfare recipient. While such
need may from time to time not be, in Goldberg's turn of phrase, "brutal,"
speaking quantitatively, it is nonetheless compelling in the constitutional
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the interest that is subjected to possible deprivation should not de-
termine whether a right to a hearing exists, it may have a legitimate
effect upon the form of notice and hearing required by due process.90
We submit that because unemployment benefits are closely analo-
gous, and often identical, to welfare benefits in their effect on an
individual's livelihood, an unemployment compensation pretermi-
nation hearing should have the same procedural elements specified
by the Court as minimal in Goldberg.1
Because the court in Torres balanced the competing interests of
the individual and the state, an examination of those interests is in
order. In Torres, as in Wheeler, Crow, and Burney, the defendant
states advanced interests identical to those expressed by California
in lava. The primary justifications advanced by the states in support
of summary termination of unemployment benefits were desires to
minimize administrative expense and to prevent possible overpay-
ments in the event that a recipient is later found ineligible. Re-
butting similar governmental justifications, the Court in Goldberg
held that such factors did not justify the denial of a pretermination
hearing: "The interest of the eligible recipient in uninterrupted
receipt of public assistance, coupled with the State's interest that his
payments not be erroneously terminated, clearly outweighs the
State's competing concern to prevent any increase in its fiscal and
administrative burdens."92  It is apparent that the expenditures ne-
cessitated by pretermination hearings in unemployment compensa-
tion cases are minimal in comparison to those needed for public as-
sistance. In addition, public assistance benefits wrongfully paid to
recipients pending a due process hearing are generally unrecoverable,
since most welfare recipients are "judgment-proof."9  Unemploy-
ment insurance recipients, on the other hand, are usually employ-
able and thus likely to return to the labor force and accumulate
sufficient funds to satisfy any debts owed to the state. If overpay-
ments are not repaid voluntarily, states can recover either by pro-
viding for an offset of future benefits to which a recipient might
sense. The payment of unemployment benefits to those entitled to them per-
mits retention of the basic human dignity that past accomplishment alone
merits, avoiding, in Macauley's stark phrase, sinking after many vicissitudes of
fortune, into abject and hopeless poverty.
335 F. Supp. at 861-62.
90 See Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 89 n.20 (1972).
91See Goldberg v. Kelley, 397 U.S. 254, 267-71 (1970).
92 397 U.S. at 266. Similarly, the Fuentes Court disposed of the state's arguments
based on administrative efficiency in a footnote. 407 U.S. at 90-91 n.20.
93 397 U.S. at 266.
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be entitled,94 or by providing for the institution of civi 9 or crim-
inal96 suits.
There are additional means of reducing overpayments available
to the states. As the Court noted in Goldberg: "Much of the drain
on fiscal and administrative resources can be reduced by developing
procedures for prompt pretermination hearings and by skillful use
of personnel and facilities. '9 7  The court in Wheeler suggested that
by increasing the number of referees, states could minimize the time
period in which appeals are pending. 8 Since the state's adminis-
trative costs are reimbursed by the federal government and may not
be drawn from the mutualized employer's fund,99 the hiring of ad-
ditional referees would have no effect on the amount of money avail-
able for the payment of benefits. Finally, the court in Wheeler
suggested the state "turn its cadre of 'fact finders' into trained, im-
partial decision makers"' 0 on the theory that improvement of the
initial determination process would reduce the number of appeals.
While there is a governmental interest in minimizing expense,
it is also important to realize that there are governmental interests
that are advanced by the payment of benefits pending a due process
hearing. One of the primary purposes of unemployment insurance
is to aid the "worker to find substantially equivalent employment."''
Summary termination of benefits causes many eligible recipients to
go without funds that would assist them in finding new work, and
may thereby increase the number of weeks for which they must even-
tually be paid benefits. Summary termination also compels some
eligible recipients to attempt, as the court in Torres admits, to resort
to welfare in order to live while the appeal is pending, thus thwart-
ing the unemployment insurance program's purpose of "main-
tain[ing] the recipient .. .without the necessity of his turning to
welfare or private charity.' 1°2  The concept of summary termina-
tion runs contrary to the Social Security Act's purpose of providing
money for the worker "at a time when otherwise he would have
94 See, e.g., CALIF. UNEMPL. INS. CODE § 1379(b) (West 1972).
951d. § 1379(a).
961d. §§ 2101, 2110, 2113.
9T 397 U.S. at 266.
98 335 F. Supp. at 862.
99 See note 31 supra.
100 335 F. Supp. at 862.
101 California Dep't of Human Resources Dev. v. Java, 402 U.S. 121, 132 (1971).
102 Id. at 131-32.
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nothing to spend,"'u 3 and thus defeats the governmental interest
in maintaining the purchasing power of the unemployed, which in
turn serves to aid industrial production. Without unemployment
benefits, a recipient may be seriously hampered in appealing his ter-
mination. Funds are necessary to get in touch with witnesses, gather
evidence, and possibly retain counsel. As the Court stated in Gold-
berg: "[A recipient's] need to concentrate upon finding the means
for daily subsistence, in turn, adversely affects his ability to seek re-
dress from... bureaucracy.' 1 0 4
Another reason why a pretermination hearing is especially valu-
able in the continued claim situation was noted by the district court
in Crow:
Though a determination that a recipient has "refused to accept
suitable employment" would, in most instances, seem pre-eminently
factual, it is made without the recipient being given advance notice
that the issue has been raised, or the right to confront and cross-
examine those persons whose testimony may prove decisive. It is
this failure to provide what are alleged to be the requisites of a
"due process fair hearing" that is said to run counter to Goldberg
and lava .... 105
2. Payment "When Due".- Probably the most important factor
affecting the interests of all parties involved in the unemployment
insurance system is the length of time required for an appeal to be
heard and decided. As the delay increases, the hardship on both
claimant and employer becomes more severe. Despite continuing
efforts to expedite the appeal process, there is in most states, and par-
ticularly in those states with the greatest caseload, a substantial time
lapse between the date of filing an appeal and the date of decision."°
The detrimental effect of this delay without benefits on the un-
employed worker is obvious. 1 7  With respect to the employer-ap-
103 Id.
104 397 U.S. at 264.
105 Crow v. California Dep't of Human Resources Dev., 325 F. Supp. 1314, 1316
(9th Cir. 1971).
100 The delays for appeals decisions vary widely from state to state, and often from
time to time within a given state. In New York, for example, from July 1971 to June
1972 more than 67 percent of the 44,323 lower authority appeals decisions took longer
than 75 days, while in North Carolina for the same period only 1.6 percent of the
lower authority appeals decisions extended beyond 75 days. In Ohio for the same period
more than 75 percent of the 7,214 lower authority appeals decisions took longer than
75 days. Averaging all states, more than 50 percent of the 311,467 total lower author-
ity appeals decisions took longer than 45 days, and roughly 30 percent took more
than 75 days. U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, MANPOWER ADMINISTRATION UNEMPLOY-
MENT INS. STATISTICS Table 17a (Aug.-Sept. 1972).
10 7 See California Dep't of Human Resources Dev. v. Java, 402 U.S. 121, 130-33
(1971).
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pellant, as the delay increases the prospects for unrecovered over-
payments will also increase. The risk of loss on the individual
employer is minimized in states using mutualized accounts and having
provisions whereby the individual employer's account is not charged
if he prevails at a later stage of the process. These practices shift
the impact of delays from the individual employer and spread it col-
lectively to all the employers in the state. On the other hand, this
type of mechanism is not available to the worker, and a long waiting
period for his appeal may mean abject poverty. In reviewing a state
unemployment procedure that involved a 37.5 day waiting period,'
the Wheeler court said that this procedure was not "reasonably cal-
culated to insure full payment [of unemployment compensation]
'when due.' ""9 Inherent in the Wheeler rationale is a policy deci-
sion that the harm caused by delay has a more serious effect on the
claimant than on the employer and that the state is in a better posi-
tion to alleviate this harm than is the individual worker.
Thus, with respect to continuing benefits pending appeal, the
continued claim situation logically involves the same weighing of
interests as the Supreme Court applied in Java to the initial deter-
mination process. The states, however, have advanced a new posi-
tion in an effort to distinguish lava. In the continued claim situation
eligibility is dependent not only on an initial finding of qualification
but also on independent weekly findings of continued eligibility.
The states contend that in lava an initial determination of eligibility
was made and that the state withheld the payment of the benefits as
a procedural device, whereas in the continued claim case there was
never a determination of eligibility and benefits did not become
"due" within the meaning of either the Social Security Act or lava.
This contention, based upon the proposition that each week involves
a new determination, was discussed both in Torres"' and Crow."'
In Torres the court held that New York's procedure complied with
section 303 (a) (1) of the Social Security Act and stated that the
lava decision was irrelevant because "benefits were suspended on
the basis of new factual circumstances which could not have been
considered at the original eligibility interview." ' 2
108 335 F. Supp. at 861. The period is measured from the date the notice of ap-
peal is filed to the date of the decision.
109 Id.
110 321 F. Supp. at 438.
111 325 F. Supp. at 1319.
112 333 F. Supp. at 344.
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A contrary conclusion was reached by the district court in Bur-
ney:
Even though defendants review on a weekly basis the eligibility of
a claimant, the court finds that the concept of when benefits are
"due" under the Social Security Act does not change from week to
week after a claimant has been found eligible and no prior, [sic]
due process hearing has been held with regard to a subsequent find-
ing of ineligibility.113
On appeal, the Supreme Court did not reach the merits of the case
since it has vacated judgment and remanded the case to the district
court to consider whether the case was mooted by'a subsequent ad-
ministrative reversal of the ineligibility determination as to class
representative Burney.1 4  Should the Supreme Court later rule on
Burney's complaint or hear the arguments of other members of her
class, present or future, the Court may reverse, ignore,115 or distin-
guish its memorandum affirmance of the lower court in Torres. The
two dissenting Justices in Burney indicated that Goldberg consider-
ations may also invalidate the attempt by the lower Court in Torres
to distinguish lava.116  The Crow opinion suggests the same con-
clusion:
The key, then, to recent cases is not whether the entitlement is
vested but whether it is contested. When an individual is deprived
of statutory benefit which he has previously enjoyed due to an ad-
verse finding where factual issues are in dispute, and where the
agency concerned has acted upon third party information, the an-
dent and "relatively immutable" jurisprudence of Greene, Snia-
dach, and Goldberg comes into play. It is in a case such as Mrs.
Crow's, where the claimant said she was offered no job, and where
the interviewer disagreed, . . . saying he had learned she refused
employment, that confrontation and cross-examination are neces-
sary. This adverse finding, based on secondhand information
which was ultimately proven inaccurate, deprived Mrs. Crow not
only of payments for the particular week, but for nine weeks be-
yond that. Especially in light of this § 1260(b) "penalty," impact
of the finding cannot be confined to that week in which it was
rendered; its real effect was to reverse, without a fair hearing, the
initial determination of eligibility. Goldberg and Java are clearly
in point, and will be applied by this court." 7
C. Erroneous Denial of Eligibility: Shifting the Risk
This section focuses on the claimant who is less fortunate than
the plaintiffs in lava in that the merit of his claim for benefits is not
113 347 F. Supp. at 223.
"4 409 U.S. 540 (1973).
115 See note 84 supra & accompanying text.
'
1 6 See note 71 supra.
117325 F. Supp. at 1319-20 (footnotes omitted).
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recognized until the hearing process. The claimant who is success-
ful at the appeal process has been deprived of the use of his benefits
during the time period required for the appellate decision." 8 As
discussed above, this deprivation is irreparable since the purposes of
the unemployment insurance program have a narrow time reference.
The goals of providing both sustenance and the means to obtain
new employment clearly cannot be remedied post facto; further, the
goal of maintaining consumer spending levels can be adversely
affected by delay in the hearing process in time of economic distress.
Statistics and common sense demonstrate a direct relationship be-
tween fluctuations in the level of unemployment and the length of
delays in the hearing process. 119 Economists reportedly agree that
the time of greatest urgency for prompt payment of benefits is "early
in the downturn, immediately after unemployment makes its appear-
ance''120 and the Java Court acknowleged this as a legislative premise
for requiring prompt payments under the Social Security Act.' 2 '
An additional risk is that those whose claims are rejected at the
initial determination will accept the decision of the claims examiner
as authoritative and will fail to process an appeal because of timidity,
lack of resources, frustration, ignorance, or other reasons.'22 The
unassertive or uninformed claimant may have been erroneously de-
nied benefits. Errors not corrected through the appeals process
obviously frustrate the goals of the program. The accuracy of the
initial determination process could be significantly improved in sev-
118 The magnitude of this problem is not determinable from current statistics. A
superficial view of this issue would suggest that the number of successful appeals by
claimants defines the limits of the problem. However, this approach assumes that every
erroneous claims determination is appealed. This assumption, in turn, involves corol-
lary assumptions that claimants have perfect knowledge of errors in the claims deter-
mination process and of the procedure for appeal. Access to legal services is another
variable which affects the size of this problem.
119 In Ohio during 1970 the average monthly volume of benefit checks for total un-
employment was 217,114. The comparable figure for 1971 is 308,068. Ohio Bureau
of Employment Services Statistics, table RS 216.2 (Feb. 9, 1972) [hereinafter cited as
OBES Statistics]. From 1970 to 1971 the number of claimants involved in appeals
received, disposed of, and pending before the Board of Review almost doubled - from
6,673 to 12,847. Id. During this period of increasing unemployment and consequent
claims for benefits, the number of cases decided by the referees only increased from
4,587 in 1970 to 6,663 in 1971. Id. table RS 221.4. The balance of the increased
caseload merely added to the backlog of cases with the result that only 45.5 percent of
all cases were decided within 75 days in 1971 as compared to 84.8 percent in 1970.
120 Clague, The Economics of Unemployment Compensation, 55 YALE L.J. 53, 69
(1945).
121 402 U.S. at 131-33.
12 2 See note 118 supra.
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eral ways: (1) a greater allocation of resources at the initial level; 2 '
(2) an allocation of personnel other than the decision-maker to
advise unsuccessful claimants of their appeal rights and the formal
recognition of this function as a significant factor in the budget; and
(3) a formal provision for certification of questionable decisions to
the hearing process at the initiative of the claims examiner or the
supervisor as an integral part of the initial determination process. 12 4
The current system of payment imposes the full risk of delay on
the claimant as well as the burden of establishing his entitlement to
benefits. In contrast, the employer and the administrative structure
are not penalized for delay in payment. In fact, under some circum-
stances the employer would derive tangible benefits from delay.
For example in a state such as Ohio, which does not charge the em-
ployer's fund and experience rating until benefits are actually paid,
delay may mean a, lower experience rating (and tax) for an entire
year.
In addition, the claimant's burden of establishing entitlement
can be made more difficult by the employer's simple allegation that
the separation was a "voluntary quit."'2 5 The claimant has the re-
sponsibility to appear in person at the claims office and present writ-
ten evidence, subject to penalties for fraud, while the employer's
obligation is limited to completion of a short form which elicits little
useful information. The employer is subject to only a modest pen-
alty for failure to return the form. A telephone confrontation will
generally entail little effort on the part of the employer, while the
claimant faces a personal confrontation with a claims examiner.
The burden shifts to the employer only after an initial decision
favors the claimant. The employer generally has no obligation to
attend a hearing requested by the claimant 26 and, in the authors'
123 See text accompanying notes 143-44 infra.
124 In order to maximize the effectiveness of this certification process, an indepen-
dent decisionmaker should be used to review the initial decision by the claims interviewer
not to certify a case.
We expect that certification will encourage the claimant to maintain an effective ap-
peal and, at the same time, would require some effort on the part of both the claimant
and the employer to collect and present evidence for the hearing. The United States
Department of Labor has recommended this approach on several occasions. USDL
Letter, supra note 45 at 6.
125 By contesting a factual issue, the employer forces the claimant to prove the
validity of his claim.
126E.g., OHio REV. CODE ANN. § 4141.28(J) (Page 1965). However, if the
employer initiates the appeal and fails to appear at the hearing, state statutes often pro-
vide for default. E.g., id. which provides, in part, that "the failure of the claimant or
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experience, the claims examiner will further examine the claimant
and adequately protect the interests of the employer.
As discussed above,'2 7 the claimant presently has the burden of
proving both monetary and nonmonetary eligibility. While the
vast majority of claimants meet the conditions for monetary eligi-
bility without dispute,'28 the primary issues on appeal are nonmon-
etary issues regarding separation or continuing claims' 9 - the most
difficult issues of proof.
The overview that emerges from the data is that claimants gen-
erally have met the preconditions for unemployment compensation
by working for a sufficient amount of time in covered employment.
A tax has been paid by the employer on the basis of their earnings
and deposited in a fund. Yet, these claimants bear the risk that they
will be unable to meet the -procedural and substantive burdens of
establishing that the unemployment is not their fault. Regardless
of the reason for separation, the claimant is not currently employed
and his lack of income can be expected to result in the adverse per-
sonal and societal consequences that the Social Security Act was de-
signed to avoid.3 0
One solution that would minimize the problems of lack of pay-
ment due to erroneous denials of benefits is to require payment to
the claimant who protests the initial determination if he has satisfied
the monetary requirements of the state law and presents a non-
other interested party to appear at the hearing, unless he is the appealing party, shall
not preclude a decision in his favor .. " Compare the language of the Java Court that
"if the employer fails to present any evidence he has in effect defaulted . 402 U.S.
at 134.
127 See notes 56-58 supra & accompanying text.
128 In Ohio during 1971, for example, 92.2 percent of the 388,539 new claimants
had sufficient base period employment to qualify for some benefits. Eighty percent of
all new claimants qualified for the maximum of 26 weeks of potential benefits. OBES
Statistic table RS 207 (Jan. 26, 1972).
129 In Ohio, for example, only 3.9 percent of the issues decided by referees during
1972 involved "wage and employment credits" and 1.3 percent involved questions of
the "dependency allowances" (which affect only the level of benefits). Seventy percent
of the Ohio referee decisions during the same period focused on "voluntary quit" or
"discharge"; the remaining 24.8 percent of the referee decisions focused almost entirely
on other nonmonetary issues. OBES Statistics table RS 221.1 (Jan. 19, 1973).
130 Cf. S. LEVITAN, PROGRAMS IN AID OF THE POOR FOR THE 1970's, at 36-40
(1969), in which the author describes the broader problem of the restrictive coverage
of the unemployed, noting that in 1967 only 42 percent of the unemployed received
benefits. Id. at 37. See also Packard, Unemployment Without Fault: Disqualifications
for Unemployment Insurance Benefits, 4 VILL. L. REV. 635 (1965), in which the au-
thor describes the process by which disqualifications are expanded by judicial and ad-
ministrative interpretations thereby departing from the original legislative intent.
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frivolous appeal.1"' Under this proposal, benefits would be paid
until a hearing is held. As in our proposal for direct certification
of questionable initial determinations to the hearing *rocess,' 2 it
is necessary that the decision as to whether a claimant's appeal is
frivolous or nonfrivolous be made by an independent decisionmaker.
This radical restructuring of the unemployment insurance pro-
gram would have the following beneficial effects: (1) the risk of
delayed payment would be eliminated; (2) the employer would
have an incentive to provide information promptly and to expedite
the hearing process, reversing the current system of incentives to
delay or to rely on administrative personnel to ferret out the facts;
(3) the administrators would face a powerful and interested insti-
tutional adversary (the employers) to police any delays in the ad-
ministrative process; (4) the purposes and goals of the prograir
would be more fully realized both through prompt payment and the
reduction of erroneous denials of benefits; (5) early entitlement
would be based on relatively objective criteria for coverage - mon-
etary facts - and the more subjective separation issues would be
resolved in the more thorough adversarial hearing process, rather
than in the informal and often expedited initial determination; (6)
the claimant would have an incentive to exercise his appeal rights.
Arguments against this proposal will undoubtedly center on the
risk of overpayments, as the arguments in Goldberg, lava, Crow,
Torres, and Burney have emphasized. As discussed above, several
methods of limiting overpayment could be easily implemented.'33
However, even if we assume that no overpayments could be re-
covered, the cost, though high, would likely be bearable. For ex-
ample, Ohio figures show that slightly more than 5 percent of new
claims determinations, a total of 21,743 claimants, involve a protest
by the claimant.134  The average weekly payment in Ohio for De-
cember 1971 was $52.29.13 5 Thus, assuming a doubling of the ap-
131 A suggested set of standards for a nonfrivolous appeal is as follows: (1) thf
claimant has presented some evidence (more than a scintilla) on each element required
to satisfy the legal rules; (2) issues of witness credibility should be resolved in favor
of the claimant for purposes of deciding whehter an appeal is nonfrivolous.
'
3 2 See note 124 supra & accompanying text.
133 Recoupment, penalties for fraud, and prompt screening to detect insubstantial ap-
peals are suggestive of the methods which could be utilized to limit overpayments. Of
course, the most effective device would be prompt appeal hearings with a strict limita-
tion on the ability of a party to delay the hearing process. See text accompanying notes
94-97 supra.
13 4 OBES Statistics table RS 207 (Jan. 26, 1972).
135U.S. DEP'T OF LABORz, MANPOWER ADMINISTRATION UNEMPLOYMENT INS.
STATISTICS 3 (March 1972).
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peal rate as a result of paying benefits pending a decision on appeal
(43,486 claimants appealing) and a 4 week delay for hearing de-
cisions, the cost would be approximately $9 million per year (43,486
X 4 weeks X $52.29/week). This is approximately 41/2 percent
of Ohio's current total annual payments of $197,234,000.136
Another objection to the proposal might be that the initial de-
cision-making process has already established a high degree of ac-
curacy. This argument might focus on the facts that only 5 percent
of the Ohio claimants appeal from adverse decisions and that, at
most, 30 percent of those claimants eventually obtain reversals.
Thus, the argument might continue, only 1 percent of the initial
determinations are revised in favor of the claimant, demonstrating
a high level of accuracy.
This argument, however, assumes that all erroneous determina-
tions are appealed, and it fails to recognize that in some situations
variables other than the correctness of the decision influence the de-
cision to appeal. Such factors include access to counsel, under-
standing of both the validity of the initial decision and the appeals
process, availability of other resources to meet living expenses, and
personal-psychological inhibitions to challenging a decision. Thus,
no clear inferences about accuracy should be drawn from the deci-
sions that are not appealed. Further, even if the process of initial
decision is highly accurate, the proposed system of presumptive
eligibility would have continuing validity, albeit to a smaller class of
individuals.
A further objection to the early payment proposal is that the in-
tegrity of the Social Security Act may be violated by payment of
benefits to individuals who have not officially been determined to
meet the state statutory eligibility criteria. This argument assumes
that all payments are made promptly "when due," which we have
seen to be untrue as to reversals of denials of eligibility which often
come 4 to 5 months or more after the filing of the appeal. 37 Our
argument instead proceeds on the factual promise of delayed pay-
136 Id. at 6.
137 Cf. California Dep't of Human Resources Dev. v. Java, 402 U.S. 121, 133
(1971), where the Court said:
We conclude that the word "due" in § 303(a)(1), when construed in light of
the purposes of the Act, means the time when payments are first administra-
tively allowed as a result of a hearing of which both parties have notice and
are permitted to present their respective positions ....
From this it can be argued that payments denied initially but later awarded following a
reversal on appeal have not been made "when due" because they are "due" at the first
hearing where payments can be permitted.
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ment and seeks to discover a method for elimination of, or at least
a shift in the risk of, delayed payment.
The goal is to make all payments immediately for eligible claim-
ants. Payment on the basis of presumptive eligibility - based on
qualification under the monetary standards and the filing of a non-
frivolous appeal - may be the only means of reaching the goal of
prompt payment of "due" benefits. 13' This proposal furthers the pur-
poses of the Act and meets the standards for risk distribution set
forth above in the following ways: (1) It would impose the cost
of the injury - loss of income due to administrative delay - on the
enterprise from which the unemployment arose. (2) It would also
impose the costs of payment on the parties whose costs for insurance
are lower, that is, the employers and employees collectively through
the existing unemployment system.
The alternatives are: (1) to continue the status quo in which the
individual bears the burden of loss; or (2) to create a new mechanism
to insure against the risk. The first alternative is inconsistent with
our premise that risks should be distributed; the second alternative
undoubtedly would be more costly (without regard to whether it is
financed by employers, employees, or the government) than our pro-
posal. In addition, our recommendations more closely coincide with
the Calabresi standard that "whenever one party is in fact in a better
position to allocate the costs of a particular loss to the appropriate
activity or merchandise, allocation of resources requires that party
to bear the original burden of the loss."'139 Our proposal would
simply shift this "original burden" from the claimant to an employ-
ers' mutualized fund and thereby allocate it to the collective busi-
ness activities from which the unemployment arose.140
In summary, we propose the prompt payment of benefits to claim-
ants who meet the monetary requirements of the state law and who
present a nonfrivolous case on the nonmonetary "separation" issues.
The justice of this proposal is in its potential to redress the otherwise
13 8 Compare the standards utilized in Note, Charity Versus Social Insurance in Un-
employment Compensation Laws, 73 YALE L.J. 357, 388 (1963), especially points
3 and 4.
139 Calabresi, supra note 8, at 506-07 (emphasis added). The "original burden" to
which we refer in this context is the financial impact of delayed payments. Because
the present unemployment insurance system does not eliminate this risk or distribute
it to the fund, the "original burden" has not been properly allocated.
140 A similar procedure is employed by some states in implementing various fed-
eral categorical assistance programs. In Ohio, for example, applicants for Aid for the
Disabled and Aid to the Blind assistance receive up to 90 days of benefits ("pending
adult assistance") while their medical forms are being processed and verified. OHiO
DBP'T OF PUBLIC WELFARE, OEHO PUBLIC AssIsTANcE MANUAL §§ 600-06 (1973).
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insoluble problem of delayed payment of benefits caused by an erro-
neous denial at the first level of the administrative process. Because
this proposal more clearly comports with the purposes of the Social
Security Act and standards of risk distribution, the authors believe
that it would be suitable as a judicial remedy to redress the existing
imbalance in administration of the unemployment insurance pro-
gram, especially in light of the extended inaction by the state legis-
latures (admittedly the most appropriate forum) and the ineffective
action by the federal government.'
While the remedy of presumptive eligibility would, in our opin-
ion, be the type of fundamental change that appears to be necessary,
we will in the next section discuss more limited options which could
more readily be implemented under the current interpretation of the
limits of the unemployment compensation statutes.
V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
We have discussed the operation of state unemployment insur-
ance systems and believe them to be deficient with respect to the
terms of the Social Security Act, the Due Process Clause of the 14th
amendment, and generally accepted principles of risk distribution.
We have already proposed full implementation of the Java ration-
ale to other stages of the administrative process at which the claim-
ant is successful, and after examining the somewhat equivocal Su-
preme Court stance on the issue, have urged the continuation of pay-
ment pending a hearing in the continuing claims cases. In addi-
141 Standards recently promulgated by the Manpower Administration of the U.S.
Department of Labor, 20 C.F.R. §§ 650-.1-.4, 37 Fed. Reg. 16173 (1972), issued un-
der its authority to promulgate rules to insure conformity with the "when due" and
"fair hearing" provisions of the Social Security Act, fail dramatically to redress the
problems described in this article in two ways: (1) the standards do not minimize the
risk of underpayment before the expiration of 30 days and (2) the standards are not fully
effective until the calendar year 1975. These weaknesses in the standards must be
viewed together with the traditional lack of enforcement of federal standards in the
certification process for state administrative funds. See Larson & Murray, Th De-
velopment of Unemployment Insurance in the United States, 8 VAND. L. REv. 181, 208-
10 (1955); DeVyver, Federal Standards in Unemployment Insurance, 8 VAND. L. REV.
411 (1955). In this context, we cannot justify high expectations of federal leadership.
Specifically, the federal standards, even when fully effective in 1975, would only re-
quire that 75 percent of the first level appeal decisions be issued within 30 days of the
date of appeal and 85 percent of such decisions within 45 days. 20 C.F.R. § 650.4(b),
37 Fed. Reg. 16174 (1972). The standards do not address directly the issue of pay-
ment before the 30 or 45 day standards or the same issue in regard to the 15 percent of
the cases which may extend beyond 45 days. Nor is a first-in, first-out method of sched-
uling required. Thus, a state could conform by avoiding troublesome cases for an in-
definite period of time. In short, the federal standards provide little redress to the prob-
lems of the individual claimant.
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ion, we have proposed a system of presumptive eligibility for claim-
ants who meet both the monetary requirements of the state law and
present a nonfrivolous appeal as a radical method of redistribution
of the risk of underpayment of benefits.
Our experience also suggests some stopgap adjustments in the
administrative process that would ameliorate the problems discussed.
These proposals would involve, a slightly different approach to the
problems through minimization of the risks of underpayment and
overpayment.42
We have seen that relatively sparse resources per case have been
committed to the process of the initial determination and the ad-
ministrative reconsideration, whereas relatively generous resources
are available at the board of review hearing level (and presumably
even greater resources at the point of judicial review).'4 Reallo-
cation of priorities among the various decisionmaking functions
could lessen the likelihood of overpayment by improving the accu-
racy of decisions at the earliest possible point in time. This can be
achieved in several ways: (1) Increase the time allocation for the
initial determination, directing that the difficult cases be given full
attention with a more thorough search for evidence, such as third
party statements, employment records and personnel policies; 14 (2)
Eliminate the administrative reconsideration since it duplicates the
investigative and supervisory work that would now be conducted at
the initial determination; (3) Expedite the hearing process to min-
imize the risk that erroneous decisions will be in effect for a long
period of time; (4) Eliminate the upper authority appeals to mini-
mize costs which can be better allocated to other areas of decision-
making, leaving the function of third-level supervision to the courts.
Recommendations 1 and 3 would increase administrative costs,
whereas 2 and 4 would result in a substantial reduction of costs.
While our third recommendation would admittedly increase the
costs of the hearing process, our first recommendation would likely,
142 This approach parallels the suggestions of the Goldberg and Wheeler courts. See
notes 97-100 supra & accompanying text
143 See note 48 supra & accompanying text.
144 Based on our own experience and discussions with Ohio Bureau of Employment
Services personnel in the Toledo, Ohio, office, it appears that claims examiners rarely
seek out or rely upon such documentary evidence as time cards, payroll records, writ-
ten warnings, or statements of company policy. Fellow employees or other third-party
witnesses are generally not consulted at the initial determination. Thus, although the
Bureau has broad statutory subpoena power to obtain documents and witnesses, this
power is generally not utilized at the initial determination level
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to an uncertain degree, reduce the number of appeals based on the
assumption that there is a direct relationship between the accuracy
of the decisions and the number of appeals. We cannot predict the
exact effect of these changes on the overall cost pattern of the sys-
tem; however, some observations on costs are in order.
The most compelling point is that the costs of accurate decision-
making already exist. The delay in the hearing process, which
would be remedied by our third recommendation, imposes costs that
are currently being borne by the claimant who is successful on ap-
peal and by the collective fund in cases in which the employer is
successful. The claimant has been irremediably deprived of the
use of his benefits because there is no institutionalized financing
mechanism to enable a claimant to borrow on the expectancy of a
successful decision from the hearing board.'45 Mutualization to the
employer's fund is a cost to the system - albeit a more fairly dis-
tributed cost. The claimant's cost is significant not only because it
is unfairly distributed, but also because it is incurred at all.
Improvement of the decisionmaking process in the suggested
manner would thus expose a real cost of delay and, at the same
time, minimize its amount by the simple expedient of hiring addi-
tional hearing examiners whose cost would be distributed among all
participants in the system. Perhaps the unemployment compensa-
tion system could then accurately be termed a system of "social in-
surance."
145 Cf. Sniadich v. Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969).
